has had a confusing influence. For the position of man-made machines is in a sense ambiguous and intermediate between the mechanical and the teleological; and habitually careless usage of such words as ' purpose ' and ' function ' in relation to them has contributed to the confusion in which the whole topic has always been obscured. Common usage allows us to speak of the purpose of a machine. What is the purpose of that machine ? we ask. And we expect and receive such answers as: The purpose of this machine, or of this piece of mechanism, is to prevent wasteful consumption of fuel, or to pump up water, or to drill holes in the rock, or what not. But of course the machine's working is not in itself purposive or teleological.

Machines and their operations are mechanical aids to and extensions of the means used by men in their endeavours to attain their goals. They are mechanical products of the teleological activities of men, It is probably largely due to the loose common practice of speaking of machines, the typical mechanisms, as teleo-logical or purposive that there has become widely preva-lent the pretence that human (and animal) activities may properly be regarded as both mechanical and teleological.

It is said: Yes, the man's action is unquestionably pur-posive ; we know that it is guided by foresight of a desired goal. But, it is added, if we could follow in detail every process of the nervous and other tissues in-volved in the action, we should find them conforming to

the established laws of physics and chemistry. This is true of machines, but, when applied to animals and men, is a mere begging of the great question in dispute, and is entirely unwarranted by any knowledge we possess.

The outstanding fact is that, even in the case of relatively